Frye illustrates this with the example of Putin’s policy toward Ukraine. As Putin strives to maintain his dominance, the “trade-off is central not only in domestic politics but also in foreign policy too” (165). Putin’s assertive foreign policy has support from Russian nationalists, “hard-liners in security agencies” and the military but does not bolster the economy and living standards. Frye explores domestic restraints on Putin with respect to his need to promote the economy but at the same time keep enough money flowing to his leading supporters, leading to corruption which weakened the economy. This comparative evaluation provides insights on Putin’s leadership after he became president in 1999 and again since 2012. To the distant American observer, foreign policy academic, or US National Security official, Putin may not appear to be a “Weak Strongman.” Frye develops this concept by identifying the constraints on both the domestic and foreign policy sides of Putin’s leadership and through comparison with the challenges faced by other personalist autocratic leaders, some of whom did not survive. Frye’s social-science training is evident in his response to the reviews, where he argues that interpretations that emphasize the influence of historical and cultural factors on Putin and his advisers need to “identify “mechanisms that allow historical legacies to produce effects through time, explain why certain legacies matter but others do not, and account for why a legacy is reappearing at one point in time rather than another.” Frye’s assessment offers a striking thesis on Putin’s foreign policy objectives and strategies as part of his central argument that Putin is less of traditional Russian tsar or a Soviet party leader and more closely resembles a personalist autocratic leader like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey or Viktor Orbán in Hungary with the very significant difference in Russia’s immense territory, modern military forces, and nuclear weapons.įrye developed his thesis through extensive primary research during his years of working in Russia as well as his continuing research as a social science professor, with particular attention to Russian public opinion surveys and administrative data which were accessible until Putin’s regime began to close off research opportunities with political restrictions. However, Frye does evaluate Putin’s foreign policies in general and refers to the earlier crisis in 2014 when Putin seized Crimea and provided arms and soldiers to support the ongoing armed resistance in the two eastern provinces of Ukraine of Luhansk and Donetsk.
Consequently, neither the book nor the reviews deal directly with the Ukraine crisis precipitated by Russian President Vladimir Putin in December 2021.
Timothy Frye’s Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia was published in April 2021, written several years earlier, and the H-Diplo reviews were submitted in October and November. Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University Northridge, Emeritus
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